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(When filled in)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SCHEDULED

6286

Support Project Initiation Memorandum (for Non-Scheduled Intelligence Production)		Type B 1998
TO: Production Control Staff.		
2. Title or Subject (31) Line 1 Status of Grain Deliveries to Line 2 the Soviet Union Line 3 Line 4 Line 5		3. Analyst(s) & Other Contributors (31) Line 1 Line 2 B Manhours: 4 Completion Date (y m d) 76-1-19
4. Requester and Purpose (39) Line 1 Katherine Brion, USSR Affairs Division Line 2 Bureau of East-West Trade Line 3 Department of Commerce Line 4 For inclusion in a report requested Line 5 from Under Secretary of Commerce by the Line 6 White House.		Classification (39) Secret.
5. Precis (39) Delays in some Soviet grain ports Line 1 reached 6 weeks in December, but have Line 2 fallen to 2-3 weeks since then. We Line 3 reiterated our estimate of Soviet port Line 4 capability and indicated port capacity Line 5 would not be a constraint to further Line 6 Soviet grain purchases. Earlier Soviet Line 7 plans for transshipping grain in West Line 8 European ports have also been cut back.		
APPROVAL:	Branch (if less than 10 manhours)	Date
	Division (if 10 manhours or greater)	Date
	Director (for special requesters)	Date

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the maximum number of character blanks to be inserted in a line—i.e., (16) means no more than 16 spaces.

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20 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Status of Grain Deliveries to the Soviet Union

1. On 19 January, supplied information on the current status of grain deliveries to Soviet ports to Katherine Brion, USSR Affairs Division, Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce, for inclusion in a report requested from Under Secretary of Commerce Baker by the White House. Because Miss Brion's request was received one hour before the reporting deadline, we telephoned the information to her.
2. In response to Under Secretary Baker's questions, we indicated delays in some Soviet ports had reached as much as six weeks during December when a record 79 ships were delivering grain to the USSR. Since then, incomplete information indicates average waits of 2 to 3 weeks at major Soviet grain ports. Inefficient Soviet railcar management and scheduling has slowed and delayed movement of imported grain from their ports. In addition, shortages of longshoremen at the ports and inland storage problems have further complicated movement of imported grain.
3. We reiterated our estimate of Soviet port capability to handle 36 million tons of grain annually. We indicated that Soviets can handle an average of 3 million tons of grain monthly, less in winter months and more in summer months. Port capacity would not be a constraint on future Soviet purchases of US grain totaling 4.3 million tons, as allowed under present US policy.
4. We indicated that earlier Soviet plans to transship as much as 7 million tons of grain through West European ports have been cut back as the lift has progressed. Currently, actual Soviet contracts call for only 1.1 million tons of transshipping in Western Europe. Storage on chartered ships is also feasible due to the current depressed chartering market.

Office of Economic Research

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20 January 1976

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